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133 S.Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, 
J., concurring); see also Kristin E. 
Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 
83 fordham L. rev. 527, 541-45 
(2014) (synthesizing several Breyer 
opinions). Meanwhile, courts 
continue to ponder without clear 
resolution whether they should 
consider legislative history or 
substantive canons of construction at 
Chevron step one or step two.
Nevertheless, at least in theory, 
Chevron is not incompatible with de 
novo review, with a reviewing court 
turning to deference only if statutory 
meaning cannot be readily deter-
mined. The Chevron Court expressly 
called for “employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction” to 
ascertain congressional intent regard-
ing statutory meaning, 467 U.S. 837, 
843 n.9 (1984). Arguably, therefore, 
a reviewing court should only turn 
to deference and the reasonableness 
inquiry described as Chevron step 
two if the statute in question is not 
susceptible to interpretation using 
those traditional methods. And many 
opinions applying Chevron take 
precisely that approach. See, e.g., FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
It is fair to observe that judges 
sometimes do not take a very thor-
ough approach to evaluating statutory 
meaning in approaching a Chevron 
analysis. For just one recent example, 
consider Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014), in which six 
justices in concurring and dissenting 
opinions criticized the plurality for 
moving straight to the reasonableness 
inquiry of Chevron step two simply 
because a snippet of statutory text 
seemed facially inconsistent.
But sometimes, too, statutory ques-
tions legitimately lack clear answers 
no matter how attentive a court is to 
text, history, and purpose. At that 
point of statutory ambiguity, courts 
have naught else to do beyond either 
nakedly choosing their own policy 
preferences or assessing whether the 
agency’s choice seems reasonable. 
Many judges are uncomfortable, and 
rightly so, with the former option. 
Indeed, the late Justice Scalia’s 
description of Chevron review in 
Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 duke L.J. 
511, is entirely consistent with this 
view—contending that Chevron’s 
inquiry into statutory meaning should 
include all of text, history, and even 
some amount of policy evaluation, 
but acknowledging that sometimes 
judges are wise to acquiesce to the 
judgment of administrative agencies. 
The difficulty is and always has been, 
whether under Chevron or otherwise, 
ascertaining when and under what 
circumstances such judicial acquies-
cence is appropriate.
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court 
could do much more than it has to 
reconcile Chevron review with the 
text of APA § 706. Given Chevron’s 
malleability, such reconciliation 
seems at least theoretically plausible, 
whether or not APA § 706 more 
explicitly calls for de novo review 
of legal questions. Until Congress 
starts writing clearer statutes (which 
seems diff icult if not impossible) 
or instructs and convinces courts 
to make their own policy choices 
in the face of statutory ambiguity 
(which seems highly unlikely), 
judicial deference is here to stay. 
The proposed Separation of Powers 
Restoration Act will accomplish 
little if anything, so why bother?
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If passed, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act would require federal courts conducting judicial 
review of agency action to decide 
“de novo all relevant questions of 
law, including the interpretation of 
constitutional and statutory provi-
sions and rules.” Although I have 
long been highly critical of Chevron, 
see, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the 
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How 
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can 
and Should be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. 
rev. 9 (2010), and also have misgiv-
ings about Auer deference, I fear 
that the proposed Act goes too far in 
completely eliminating deference to 
agency legal determinations.
In testimony before the Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust 
Law subcommittee of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, from 
which these comments are drawn, I 
have advocated for a more moderate 
solution that would encourage courts 
to apply the factors articulated in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944), to determine how much, if 
any, deference should be afforded to 
agency legal determinations. Pursuant 
to Skidmore, agency interpretations 
deserve deference when the agency 
has thoroughly considered the ques-
tion, when its reasoning makes good 
sense and when its views have been 
consistent (and thus not shifting with 
the political winds).
Before returning to the substance 
of my proposal, it is appropriate to 
point out that the characterization of 
deference to agency legal determina-
tions as a violation of separation of 
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powers is misguided. While it may 
appear that judicial deference to 
agency legal decisions is inconsistent 
with fundamental notions of the 
judicial role, as embodied in Marbury 
v. Madison’s famous statement that 
“it is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is,” 5 U.S. 137, 177 
(1803), judicial deference to agency 
legal determinations in most contexts 
involving judicial review does not 
implicate separation of powers for 
the simple reason that there is no 
constitutional entitlement to judicial 
review. Congress could constitution-
ally eliminate judicial review of 
rulemaking and many adjudicatory 
decisions, except in those situations 
in which judicial review is required 
to satisfy Article III concerns over 
agency adjudication of private rights.
In light of the long tradition of 
judicial consideration of agency 
views when reviewing agency legal 
determinations, The Separation of 
Powers Restoration Act is too blunt. 
It would not recognize situations 
in which Congress intends that 
reviewing courts defer to agency 
legal determinations, for example 
in highly technical or sensitive areas 
in which Congress expects agencies 
to clarify statutory ambiguities or 
when Congress sometimes explicitly 
indicates that an agency should define 
a statutory term. Because there are 
contexts in which Congress has 
traditionally favored judicial defer-
ence to agency legal determinations, 
the proposal would force Congress 
to make explicit exceptions to its 
application or it would frustrate 
Congress’s intent in such contexts.
Thus, while the proposal is a 
laudable effort to dispel some of the 
negative consequences and confusion 
caused by the Chevron doctrine, 
insofar as it would disable reviewing 
courts from taking into account the 
views of an administering agency on 
questions of statutory interpretation 
and make it difficult for Congress 
to allow deference to administering 
agencies when appropriate, it may go 
too far.
In my view, it would be appropri-
ate for Congress to craft legislation 
in reaction to all of the problems 
Chevron deference has caused without 
totally ruling out judicial deference 
to agency views on legal conclusions. 
My suggestion is to add the following 
language to APA § 706, after sub-
section 2(F):
Unless expressly required otherwise 
by statute, the reviewing court shall 
decide all questions of law de novo, 
with due regard for the views of the 
agency administering the statute 
and any other agency involved in 
the decisionmaking process.
Under this standard, courts would 
apply the pre-APA Skidmore factors 
for determining how much to defer 
to agency interpretations, but they 
would have f lexibility to shape the 
deference doctrine to meet modern 
concerns and legal doctrine.
The “due regard” language would 
allow courts to calibrate the degree 
of deference to the particular situ-
ation. There might be contexts in 
which minimal to no deference is 
appropriate; for example, where 
Congress has expressed strong policy 
preferences but in accidentally 
ambiguous language. There may 
also be statutory gaps that Congress 
would expect agencies to f ill in 
accord with Congress’s intent rather 
than by agency policy views. There 
may be other contexts, however, 
in which the language, structure, 
and purposes of a statute indicate 
that Congress expects reviewing 
courts to defer to persuasive agency 
reasoning concerning the proper 
construction of a statute or statutory 
gaps that Congress would have 
wanted an agency to f ill in line with 
consistent administrative policy. 
Concerns over excessive deference 
would be met by application of the 
Skidmore factors, informed by f idelity 
to Congress’s expressed preference 
for less deference than has been the 
case under Chevron. The Skidmore 
factors are good indications that the 
agency has applied its expertise to 
the matter and acted with due regard 
to Congress’s intent underlying the 
statute being construed.
In conclusion, while there is 
no doubt that reform to Chevron 
and Auer is needed, the proposed 
Separation of Powers Restoration 
Act goes too far in eliminating 
judicial consideration of agency 
views when reviewing agency legal 
determinations. A more moderate 
reform, perhaps in the form of reviv-
ing the Skidmore factors, would be 
preferable.
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